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| {{DISPLAYTITLE:{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution–discussion page}}__NOTOC__This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page ''{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution''. | | {{DISPLAYTITLE:{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution–discussion page}}__NOTOC__This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page ''{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution''. |
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| ==add ?==
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| Thomas, Interpretative Commentary, I TEX. CONST. art. III, § 56 (1955)
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| Volume 25 American Jurisprudence (first ed.) Special Legislation 317
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| Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322, 328 (purpose of restriction)
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| Ayars' App., 122 Pa. 266, 277 !!!!!
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| Colley v. Jasper County, 337 Mo. 503, 85 SW2d 57
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| ==review==
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| https://cite.case.law/pdf/1436032/Henderson%20v.%20Koenig,%20168%20Mo.%20356%20(1902).pdf 21 376 ("But the assertion is made that cases have been decided
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| by this court where local or special legislation, that is to
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| say, legislation applicable alone to the city of St. Louis, or
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| alone to Kansas City, has been held valid. This is true, but
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| in the decisions in none of those cases was there any expression or ruling which impinges in the slightest degree on the
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| constitutional prohibition against a local or special law being
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| enacted where a general law could have been made applicable;
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| on the contrary, either distinct or else implied recognition is
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| constantly given to the idea that, owing to the circumstances
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| and exigencies of the particular case, a general law could not
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| have been made applicable, or where it could not have been
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| made applicable by reason of the fact that the legislation questioned was the result of direct obedience to some specific command of the Constitution.")
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| Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246
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| Reed v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 177, 59 S.W. 255
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| San Antonio v. State 270 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.Civ.App. 1954, ref.)
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| Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation District, Tex.Civ.App., 284 S.W.2d 275 (n.r.e.)
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| King v. Sheppard, Tex.Civ.App., 157 S.W.2d 682 (ref.w.m.)
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| Langdeau v. Bouknight, 162 Tex. 42, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961)
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| J. Keith, CITY AND COUNTY HOME RULE IN TEXAS 45 (1951)
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| Rios v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 609, 288 S.W.2d 77 (1955)
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| San Antonio v. State ex rel. Criner, 270 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1954, ref'd)
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| x Womack v. Carson, 123 Tex. 260, 65 S.W.2d 485 (1933)
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| x Urban v. Harris County, 251 S.W. 594 (TCA-Galveston 1923, ref'd)
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|
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| == true ==
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| all counties where the same circumstances exist must have the same form of government
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| so that a law for one class can reasonably be
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| expected to work equally well for every member of the
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| class ; while, if it works ill, it is almost certain to do so in
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| every case, and that for some cause which lies deeper than
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| the mere fact that the law is general. The number of
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| places necessarily affected by a law prevents, moreover, the
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| enactment of laws designed in the interest of one place
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| only. If such a law be against the interest of the other
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| communities affected by it, they will oppose its passage, and
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| thus the unfair grant of special privileges will be prevented
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|
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| almost every local law affects people residing outside the locality, the
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| distinction between general and local laws would seem,
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| under the doctrine of these cases, to be very indefinite.
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