|
Tags: Replaced Manual revert |
| Line 1: |
Line 1: |
| {{DISPLAYTITLE:{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution–discussion page}}__NOTOC__This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page ''{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution''. | | {{DISPLAYTITLE:{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution–discussion page}}__NOTOC__This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page ''{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution''. |
|
| |
| == SJR 40 ==
| |
|
| |
| C.S.S.J.R. 40
| |
| By: Birdwell
| |
| State Affairs
| |
| Committee Report (Substituted)
| |
| BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
| |
| The resolution sponsor has informed the committee of the history of the Texas statutes that
| |
| currently guide the governor's and legislature's responses to states of disaster and states of
| |
| emergency, relating to the committee that the Texas Disaster Act of 1975 was derived from
| |
| model legislation and that the statutes regarding states of emergency predate that act. According
| |
| to the resolution sponsor, while the two areas of law have some provisions that are parallel,
| |
| others are misaligned and the act misstates the governor's ability to suspend what the act calls
| |
| "regulatory statutes," even though in Texas regulations and statutes are distinct provisions, and
| |
| the statute regarding states of emergency references the legislature's authority to terminate an
| |
| emergency "at any time" even though the legislature can only apply this power when it is in
| |
| session. The resolution sponsor has additionally informed the committee that recent disasters,
| |
| including the COVID-19 pandemic, have raised questions regarding the legislature's role in
| |
| addressing large-scale disasters and regarding its ability to address disaster planning when it can
| |
| only act to the extent permitted by the governor when it is not in session and cannot call itself
| |
| into session. The resolution sponsor has further told the committee that the disaster act was
| |
| designed to empower the executive branch to oversee a uniform response to threats facing Texas
| |
| but also was meant to engage the legislative branch as a check to this power. C.S.S.J.R. 40,
| |
| along with S.B. 871, seeks to rebalance the legislative and executive powers during states of
| |
| emergency and states of disaster while acknowledging the governor's role as primary emergency
| |
| management director for the state. The resolution accomplishes this by clarifying the roles of
| |
| the governor and the legislature during emergencies and disasters while enhancing transparency
| |
| and accountability in government during those periods.
| |