Texas Constitution talk:Article I, Section 28: Difference between revisions
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== SJR 40 == | |||
C.S.S.J.R. 40 | |||
By: Birdwell | |||
State Affairs | |||
Committee Report (Substituted) | |||
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE | |||
The resolution sponsor has informed the committee of the history of the Texas statutes that | |||
currently guide the governor's and legislature's responses to states of disaster and states of | |||
emergency, relating to the committee that the Texas Disaster Act of 1975 was derived from | |||
model legislation and that the statutes regarding states of emergency predate that act. According | |||
to the resolution sponsor, while the two areas of law have some provisions that are parallel, | |||
others are misaligned and the act misstates the governor's ability to suspend what the act calls | |||
"regulatory statutes," even though in Texas regulations and statutes are distinct provisions, and | |||
the statute regarding states of emergency references the legislature's authority to terminate an | |||
emergency "at any time" even though the legislature can only apply this power when it is in | |||
session. The resolution sponsor has additionally informed the committee that recent disasters, | |||
including the COVID-19 pandemic, have raised questions regarding the legislature's role in | |||
addressing large-scale disasters and regarding its ability to address disaster planning when it can | |||
only act to the extent permitted by the governor when it is not in session and cannot call itself | |||
into session. The resolution sponsor has further told the committee that the disaster act was | |||
designed to empower the executive branch to oversee a uniform response to threats facing Texas | |||
but also was meant to engage the legislative branch as a check to this power. C.S.S.J.R. 40, | |||
along with S.B. 871, seeks to rebalance the legislative and executive powers during states of | |||
emergency and states of disaster while acknowledging the governor's role as primary emergency | |||
management director for the state. The resolution accomplishes this by clarifying the roles of | |||
the governor and the legislature during emergencies and disasters while enhancing transparency | |||
and accountability in government during those periods. | |||
Revision as of 16:05, June 10, 2025
This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page Article I, Section 28 of the Texas Constitution.
SJR 40
C.S.S.J.R. 40 By: Birdwell State Affairs Committee Report (Substituted) BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE The resolution sponsor has informed the committee of the history of the Texas statutes that currently guide the governor's and legislature's responses to states of disaster and states of emergency, relating to the committee that the Texas Disaster Act of 1975 was derived from model legislation and that the statutes regarding states of emergency predate that act. According to the resolution sponsor, while the two areas of law have some provisions that are parallel, others are misaligned and the act misstates the governor's ability to suspend what the act calls "regulatory statutes," even though in Texas regulations and statutes are distinct provisions, and the statute regarding states of emergency references the legislature's authority to terminate an emergency "at any time" even though the legislature can only apply this power when it is in session. The resolution sponsor has additionally informed the committee that recent disasters, including the COVID-19 pandemic, have raised questions regarding the legislature's role in addressing large-scale disasters and regarding its ability to address disaster planning when it can only act to the extent permitted by the governor when it is not in session and cannot call itself into session. The resolution sponsor has further told the committee that the disaster act was designed to empower the executive branch to oversee a uniform response to threats facing Texas but also was meant to engage the legislative branch as a check to this power. C.S.S.J.R. 40, along with S.B. 871, seeks to rebalance the legislative and executive powers during states of emergency and states of disaster while acknowledging the governor's role as primary emergency management director for the state. The resolution accomplishes this by clarifying the roles of the governor and the legislature during emergencies and disasters while enhancing transparency and accountability in government during those periods.